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Abstract 
Because levels of party institutionalization may affect the availability of good data, existing datasets have limited 
reliability and coverage. To overcome these problems, we introduce the V-Dem Party Institutionalization 
Index, the first global country-level index on the issue. It covers – as of May 2017 – 173 countries for 116 
years (1900-2016). Its geographical coverage, timespan, and conceptual reach are larger than any existing 
alternative. We offer an additive index that measures the scope and depth of party institutionalization in a 
country every year. Scope is measured by the proportion of parties that reach a threshold of minimal 
institutionalization, while the linkages party establish with the masses and the elites define the depth. Exploring 
a set of well-known cases, we show that: the index has extensive face validity, is consistent across regime types, 
and is comparable to other established indicators of institutionalization. 
 
Introduction 
Political parties are ubiquitous in modern polities. They lie at the core of modern democracy (Schattschneider, 
2003), and an increasing number of authoritarian regimes have also become party-based (Svolik, 2012, 
Levitsky and Way, 2010). Parties are also some of the most consequential political institutions, affecting regime 
survival (Bernhard et al., 2015, Mainwaring and Scully, 1995, Brownlee, 2007, Magaloni, 2006, Gandhi, 2008), 
economic outputs (Bizzarro et al., 2015, Gehlbach and Keefer, 2011, Gehlbach and Keefer, 2012, Miller, 2015, 
Hicken, 2016), and the likelihood of internal violent conflicts (Fjelde, 2010). Despite this excellent work, one 
of the major challenges for the further advancement of the scholarship on political parties and their 
consequences has been the absence of good comparative data (Poguntke et al., 2016).  
Existing datasets have limited time and space coverage, and due to the intensive work involved in 
carefully collecting information on this topic, existing indicators tend to measure only one of the many 
dimensions on which parties and party systems vary (Tavits, 2013). Additionally, because the availability of 
good data on political parties could itself be a function of the nature of a party system, issues of data reliability 
and measurement error are always present – although often ignored. 
In this article, we present a new country-level index of party institutionalization developed in the context 
of the Varieties of Democracy project (Coppedge et al., 2016b). The V-Dem Party Institutionalization Index stands 
out as the first global index on the issue, covering – as of May 2017 – 173 countries for a maximum of 115 
years (1900-2015). It extends far beyond any existing indicator in terms of geographical coverage, timespan, 
and conceptual reach.  
We propose a three-dimensional index, measuring: 1) the scope of party institutionalization in a country, 
2) the proportion of parties that reach a threshold of minimal institutionalization, and 3) variations in the depth 
of this institutionalization – focusing on the links parties establish with voters and elites. The final additive 
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index we create reflects these dimensions. Two features of the index are notable and unique. First, it 
consistently measures party institutionalization in democracies and autocracies. Second,  it takes advantage of 
the unique research design of the V-Dem project, employing state-of-the-art practices for cross-national data 
collection of political indicators (Coppedge et al., 2016c). We argue that those features make the V-Dem Party 
Institutionalization Index the most empirically and theoretically robust measurement tool for the comparative 
analysis of parties and party systems available. 
 
I. Party Institutionalization 
Political parties are complex organizations. While there are minimalist definition of political parties, like 
Anthony Downs’ “parties are group of men competing for political power in elections,” (Downs 1957), the 
examination of political parties as real world political organizations suggests that parties are complex, multi-
faceted organizations that often defy simply definition or classification. At the most basic level, parties are 
composed of political elites, they engage in election activities, and they manage political power (Key, 1964, 
Katz, 1980). But beyond this minimalist set of characteristics parties vary widely. Individual parties may invest 
more time and resources in developing one of those three basic facets, and parties with different emphases 
tend to be organized and behave very differently (Müller and Strøm, 1999). Moreover, parties have increasingly 
been important actors in autocracies, where they may or may not participate in elections (Magaloni, 2006, 
Svolik, 2012). 
Comparing such a variegated set of organizations is a complicated task. One way to approach this 
comparison is asking about parties’ degree of institutionalization. Although definitions of institutionalization 
vary from author to author, most of them derive from Huntington’s (1968) or Panebianco’s (1988) work. The 
two definitions have in common a focus on temporal stability – institutionalization is a process by which 
organizations become stable and survive over time without major changes – and the argument that 
organizations acquire a long term value – political elites, party members, and voters, value parties for their long 
term contributions, and are willing to sacrifice their short-term objectives for the party’s long term goals 
(Levitsky, 2003, Basedau and Stroh, 2008). Huntington calls this dimension of institutionalization “value-
infusion”, while Panebianco associates it with passage between different modes of party organization.  
We diverge slightly from the literature and understand institutionalization not as a process – which 
implies a diachronic concept – but rather as a measure of the degree to which a party approximates an ideal 
type. The more similar the party is to this ideal type, the more institutionalized it is. Our ideal, type, however, 
assumes many of the characteristics authors like Huntington and Panebianco attributed to countries that 
experienced the “process of institutionalization”.  
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First, Institutionalized parties are stable. Stability, however, needs to be understood in very specific 
terms, and we argue that the most fruitful way is to evaluate the degree to which parties constitute stable 
organizations.  
Second, institutionalized parties impose the parties’ long-term goals over individual elites’ short-term 
goals. This is how we understand the notion of “value-infusion”. Parties become larger than their members, 
and their survival are valued by all members regardless of the parties’ short-term contribution to individual 
careers. The challenge, of course, is that the payoffs elites extract from affiliating with a party cannot be directly 
measured, since it is a function of each individual elite’s subjective evaluation of the party’s value. What can be 
measured is the behavior of actual elites: when they sacrifice their individual short-term interests to the parties’ 
interests, this signals the supremacy of the party over the individual politician. 
Third, we acknowledge that parties matter beyond their role in elite politics, playing a crucial role in 
connecting and mobilizing the public (Sartori, 2005, Smith, 2005). Those connections mimic the relationship 
elites have with their parties: voter-party connections can be more or less stable, and more or less long-term 
oriented. When connections between parties and voters are more stable and more long-term oriented, we 
expect parties to be more institutionalized.  
In this discussion, we interact with the large literature focusing on the institutionalization of individual 
parties. However, party institutionalization also has important consequences for systemic institutionalization. 
The degree of institutionalization of the set of parties in one given polity contributes to the level of party system 
institutionalization. Hicken and Kuhonta (2014) treat party institutionalization as the central “internal 
dimension” of system institutionalization. Mainwaring and his co-authors (Forthcoming)  go further as they 
separate party system institutionalization – i.e., the stability in the set of actors and in the patterns of 
competition among them – from party institutionalization, arguing that the latter works is a causal 
underpinning of the former. We follow this logic in the present article. 
 
II. Measuring Party Institutionalization  
Appropriately measuring characteristics of political regimes is a major challenge for contemporary political 
science. Political institutions are multifaceted, sometimes internally contradictory, and are the product of a 
series of historically bounded processes. Finding valid and reliable ways to comparatively assess levels and 
changes in these institutions has inspired major research projects in the discipline for many years (Coppedge 
et al., 2011). Among those projects, a handful of them have focused on political parties and party systems, 
offering remarkably valuable data about parties’ organizational characteristics and policy preferences, and 
about party systems’ dynamics and stability (Kitschelt, 2013, Volkens et al., 2016, Poguntke et al., 2016, 
Mainwaring et al., 2016, Basedau and Stroh, 2008, Kollman et al., 2016).  
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All these efforts however, have encountered important practical limits. Parties are the most widespread 
political institution in the world and they vary widely even within territorial units. Official sources of 
information about parties are rare. Autocracies have few incentives to publicize information about the ruling 
party. In democracies, the separation between parties and the state usually leaves a large part of the burden for 
archiving and publicizing relevant data to the parties themselves, and making this information available is not 
typically a priority for those parties. Moreover, the availability of data about parties is most likely correlated 
with their degree of institutionalization – more institutionalized parties tend to be better at producing and 
storing systematic information – increasing the challenges for data collection efforts, and hampering our ability 
to draw inferences from the data we do collect. These challenges have limited the available data about political 
parties to specific regions of the world or to a limited set of indicators (Tavits, 2013).  
The V-Dem project overcomes these limits in two ways. First, rather than relying on primary data about 
parties, V-Dem recruited a team of almost 3,000 experts to collaborate on a joint effort to code multiple regime 
characteristics (Coppedge et al., 2016c). Guided by the principles of multidimensionality, disaggregation, and 
transparency, V-Dem relied on expert knowledge of 173 countries to collect information about the 
configuration of political institutions in the world for the last 115 years. Those experts answered a set of 
questions in a survey designed to clearly and unambiguously delineate the characteristics of 5 dimensions of 
democracy (electoral, liberal, egalitarian, participatory, and deliberative) as well as of additional institutional 
characteristics of political regimes (sovereignty, governance, and, of course, political parties). This survey and 
the subsequent creation of the V-Dem dataset followed some of the most advanced techniques in the field of 
expert surveys, producing a set of 400+ indicators of regime characteristics.  
Additionally, when asking about parties, V-Dem avoided concentrating on individual organizations and 
asked experts to provide “country-level” assessments. It asked about “the parties” or “the main parties” in 
each political system, rather than about party A or B. This allowed for more efficient and reliable data 
collection, ensuring the availability of global data about party organizations. In doing so, V-Dem overcame a 
third important challenge to the existing set of empirical indicators about political parties: aggregation. While 
aggregating scores for individual parties to constitute country-level indicators is usually tricky, involving 
intricate formulas and weights, V-Dem’s approach aggregates by design, constituting a set of clear and reliable 
indicators for cross-national comparative analysis of political parties. 
Specifically, twelve questions in the survey concerned political parties. They can be divided in 4 
categories:2 the scope of party institutionalization, the degree of party institutionalization, other characteristics 
of political parties, and information about the institutional environment in which parties exist. Eleven of those 
variables were ordinal / categorical, with categories corresponding to gradations that delineated the degree to 
																																								 																				
2 Table A1 in Appendix A contains the result of an Exploratory Factor Analysis to inductively identify the structure 
of the data. 
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which a country reached a pre-defined ideal type. Coders’ scores were then mapped into a continuous latent 
variable using a Bayesian IRT model (Pemstein et al., 2015), ensuring cross-national validity and the reliability 
of the indicators produced. One of the variables (Party Switch) asked voters to report continuous values on a 
scale. The values in the V-Dem dataset are the mean of the results reported by coders in this question. 
In this article, we concentrate on five of these variables and include them on our Index of Party 
Institutionalization. Table 1 has the text of the questions and descriptive statistics of their final continuous 
version.  
“Party Organizations” asks how many of the parties in a country have permanent organizations, 
explicitly mentioning party personnel that carry out party activities outside of elections. “Party Branches” asks 
a similar question, focusing on a different type of political organization: local branches. It asks how many of 
the parties have permanent local branches, additional evidence of the materiality of the party organization. 
Those two variables are highly correlated with a third, “Distinct platforms”, that asked coders to provide 
information on how many of the parties in the system have publicly disseminated and distinct platforms. The 
structure of their answers is similar, varying from “none of the parties” to “all the parties”. Consistently, 
variation in the final continuous scores reflect variation from party systems in which none or few of the parties 
present these characteristics (lower scores) to party systems in which most or all the parties have national 
organizations, local branches, and publicly available and disseminated platforms.  
We claim that these three questions provide an assessment of the scope of party institutionalization 
within a country. It is essentially asking how many of the parties in a country present a pre-determined set of 
characteristics that are associated with institutionalized parties – the presence of stable national and local 
organizations, and of a set of commitments that the party makes to a platform and label. They directly connect 
to the organizational stability dimension of institutionalization discussed in the theoretical section, and they 
provide a sense of the proportion of the parties in each country that meet these theoretical expectations. 
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Table 1. Variables Included in the Index 
Party organizations (v2psorgs) 
How many political parties for national-level office have permanent organizations? 
0: No parties. 1: Fewer than half. 2: About half. 3: More than half. 4: All parties. 
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N 
0.02 1.65 -3.25 3.31 16648 
Party branches (v2psprbrch) 
How many parties have permanent local party branches? 
0: No parties. 1: Fewer than half. 2: About half. 3: More than half. 4: All parties. 
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N 
-0.03 1.61 -3.17 3.56 16640 
Distinct party platforms (v2psplats) 
How many political parties with representation in the national legislature or presidency have 
publicly available party platforms (manifestos) that are publicized and relatively distinct from 
one another? 
0: No parties. 1: Fewer than half. 2: About half. 3: More than half. 4: All parties. 
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N 
-0.04 1.66 -3.02 3.52 16547 
Legislative party cohesion (v2pscohesv) 
Is it normal for members of the legislature to vote with other members of their party on 
important bills? 
0: Not really. Many members are elected as independents and party discipline is very weak. 
1: More often than not. Members are more likely to vote with their parties than against them, 
but defections are common. 
2: Mostly. Members vote with their parties most of the time. 
3: Yes, absolutely. Members vote with their parties almost all the time. 
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N 
0.27 1.39 -3.90 2.50 16462 
Party linkages (v2psprlnks) 
Among the major parties, what is the main or most common form of linkage to their 
constituents? 
0: Clientelistic. Constituents are rewarded with goods, cash, and/or jobs. 
1: Mixed clientelistic and local collective. 
2: Local collective. Constituents are rewarded with local collective goods, e.g., wells, toilets, 
markets, roads, bridges, and local development. 
3: Mixed local collective and policy/programmatic. 
4: Policy/programmatic. Constituents respond to a party’s positions on national policies, general 
party programs, and visions for society. 
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N 
0.05 1.44 -3.13 3.26 16515 
Source: Coppedge et al. (2016a) 
 
To learn more about levels of institutionalization we add two variables to our index. They differ from 
the previous three in two ways. They are not concerned with the reach of some characteristics within the party 
systems. Rather, coders were asked either to concentrate on “the major parties” or on legislators. More 
importantly, they allow coders to distinguish among variations in parties’ characteristics.  We capture the 
degree to which political elites submit to parties’ position – our second theoretical dimension – with a question 
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about the degree of legislative cohesion among party members (“Party Legislative Cohesion”). Answers varied 
from situations of absent party discipline in legislatures to situations of full discipline.  
Finally, we include an indicator that aims at measuring variations in voter-party linkages. Although those 
linkages can vary dramatically (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007) linkages between parties and voters are often 
placed along a continuum that ranges from individualistic to collective connections. Following Mancur 
Olson’s (2009) pioneering discussion about the conditions under which individuals engage in collective 
enterprises – like parties – scholars have acknowledged that individuals do so when they receive goods that 
compensate for their time and energy commitment (Panebianco, 1988). Those goods are not only material 
goods, they can be immaterial or ideational. Generally, however, the discussion focuses private, club and public 
goods. Private or selective goods are targeted to specific individuals (clientelistic connections). Public goods 
are targeted to large social groups or even the whole population, are the most extreme end of collective 
connection. Goods that target specific collective constituencies (club goods or group clientelism) are a kind of 
intermediate category. The variable “Party Linkages” captures this variation. 
This question is adapted from a similar question used in the Democratic Accountability and Linkages 
Project (Kitschelt, 2013). Given the discussion in the previous section, we treat programmatic linkages as a 
sign of party institutionalization (because they are more stable and long-term oriented), make “club” or “locally 
collective” goods sign intermediate linkages, and associate clientelistic connections with lower levels of party 
institutionalization.  
We acknowledge that clientelistic linkages can be stable. Clientelistic networks can create and perpetuate 
loyalties which emerge from private goods distribution (Hicken 2011). However, clientelistic connections are 
certainly more short-term oriented than ideology-based linkages.  Moreover, those connections are extremely 
costly to maintain over extended periods of time. Consequently, when we consider Party Institutionalization 
in the terms here proposed, treating contexts with more ideological connections as showing greater 
institutionalization is a theoretically consistent choice. Additionally, there is a clear and positive empirical 
association between the Party Linkages variable as we adopt it (with values ranging from low [predominantly 
clientelistic] to high [predominantly programmatic]) and the other dimensions of the index. Correlations 
shown in Table A2 in Appendix A show positive correlations between Party Linkages and all other variables 
included in the Index. 
Together these five variables capture central parts of the concept we want to measure. Collectively they 
indicate proportion of the parties in the system that have robust organizations and the extent to which the 
parties’ long-term goals orient the behavior of elites and masses in a political system. They also capture 
dynamics that are specific to the concept we aim at measuring. These variables specifically measure the 
characteristics of parties and not the characteristics of party systems. While party system institutionalization 
looks at stability in the interactions between the parties (Mainwaring et al., Forthcoming), the V-Dem Party 
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Institutionalization Index is concerned with patterns and variations in the organization and behavior of the 
political parties themselves, with nothing about their interaction being measured.  
Additionally, the variables chosen are also internally consistent. Empirically they show positive 
associations, although they are differentiated enough to be treated individually as shown on Table A1 in the 
Appendix. Theoretically they all tap into the same ideas of stability and long-term dynamics that have been in 
the core of the concept of institutionalization since Huntington and Panebianco first formulated it.  
Equally important, they resonate with existing realities and incorporate information about parties that 
are not time-bound. We do not use information on parties’ finances or number of members, for example, 
which are hard to measure cross-nationally and which may be less or more relevant to assessing the 
institutionalization of parties at different times and places. We concentrate on a consistent set of indicators to 
measure the scope of Party Institutionalization (the presence of national and local organizations, and a publicly 
available platform) and incorporate variations in the degree of institutionalization that are not time-bound: 
party-cohesion among elites and programmatic connections with voters.  
These measures are also consistent across different types of political regimes. Think about Sweden and 
China, two countries that score high in our index. In both, “all parties” (in China “all parties” is just one party) 
have national and local organizations, with publicly available platforms, and parties in the two countries show 
high levels of cohesion among elites, and establish programmatic linkages with citizens. This constitutes a 
unique feature of the V-Dem Party Institutionalization Index. 
In line with our theoretical treatment of the concept, we use an additive strategy to aggregate the 
indicators. This approach follows a “logic of substitutability”, in which lower values in one indicator can be 
compensated by higher values in the others (Coppedge, 2012). Consequently, countries where all parties are 
strongly institutionalized would score high in all our scope and depth questions and will have high values in 
the Party Institutionalization Index. At the same time, countries scoring well in only some of the five indicators 
will still receive higher values than countries that receive low values in all. This strategy ensures greater variation 
in the final index, producing meaningful differentiation between the observations. Technically speaking, we 
first standardize all the five variables and add them to form the new index. We then convert the final index’s 
values to its cumulative density function. This operation bounds its values at 0 and 1. Figure 1 depicts the 
operation.  
 
Figure 1. Index Structure 
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III. Party Institutionalization across the Globe 
A first empirical test of our index is the alignment between the theory we developed and the data 
resulting from our empirical strategy. The values in the Index should – to some degree – be 
consistent with our shared understanding of empirical reality. If the resulting indicator suggested 
that the highest levels of Party Institutionalization in the world are in some African or Middle 
Eastern countries, well-known for the fragility of their parties, readers would rightly question the 
value of this indicator. 
We start by analyzing Figure 2, which has the yearly global average of our index. It tells a 
familiar story. Global average levels have increased over time (0.34 in 1900, 0.66 in 2014), but as 
many authors have documented, the number of regimes with political parties has also increased: 
there are more democracies now, and the number of party-based authoritarianisms is larger than 
ever (Svolik 2012). Additionally, the little spike in the line after 1945 captures both the 
establishment of many authoritarian regimes with strong parties (mostly in the communist world), 
as well as the beginning of second wave democracies. 
 
Figure 2. Global Average of the Party Institutionalization Index (1900-2015) 
 
 
The line in Figure 2 is surrounded by a shaded area representing the 70% High Posterior 
Density Interval extracted from the posterior distribution of this variable. The V-Dem 
measurement model estimates as its final product a distribution of the most likely values for a 
country-year observation. The median of this distribution is the point-estimate available in the V-
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Dem dataset and the bold line in Figure 2. The 70% HPD serve as the confidence intervals for 
these estimates and are reported here and in other figures of this text. These intervals can be 
considered measures of uncertainty: they are an estimation of measurement error and can – and 
should – be incorporated in any causal inferential analysis using V-Dem data (Bizzarro, Pemstein, 
and Coppedge 2016). Besides the other features already introduced, measures of uncertainty are 
an additional component of the V-Dem dataset that makes it stand out among the existing 
indicators of political institutions. 
Figure 3 breaks down averages by region. All regions experienced increased levels of party 
institutionalization in comparison to the beginning of the century, even the consolidated 
democracies in Western Europe, North America, and Oceania (West) – where some argue that 
parties have declined (Ignazi, 1996). The only region where levels of party institutionalization were 
lower in 2010 than in 1950 is Eastern Europe, where the collapse of the Communist regimes – 
with strongly institutionalized parties – led to the emergence of multiparty democracies that had 
notoriously weaker parties, particularly during the 1990s (Grzymala-Busse, 2002). 
 
Figure 3. Regional Averages of Party Institutionalization 
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Figure 4 offers further confirmation of the argument that global and regional changes 
might be influenced by the changes in the sample of countries where parties are organized. We use 
Boix, Miller and Rosatto’s dichotomous regime classification (2012) to separate authoritarian from 
democratic regimes, and plot the regime averages for our Index of Party Institutionalization for 
the 1900-2015 period. While the average level of institutionalization in democracies decreases 
between the early 20th century, when just few democracies existed, and the end of the series, the 
average for autocracies increases, reflecting the rise of party-based authoritarian regimes, with 
some variation around the moments in which communist regimes emerged, and collapsed. 
 
Figure 4. Regime Averages of Party institutionalization 
 
 
We also compared our Index to Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) regime typology. We 
collapsed all the categories where parties are mentioned (party, party-military, party-personal, 
party-military-personal) in one “party-based” regime characteristic and compared the average level 
of Party Institutionalization in country-years coded as such in the GWF dataset against years coded 
otherwise (personal, military, oligarchy, monarchy, and their combinations). We found a 
statistically significant difference between the two means: on average, authoritarian regimes not 
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party-based have scores in our Party Institutionalization Index 38% smaller than the party-based 
authoritarianisms in their sample. 
Additional information about the association between regime type and levels of Party 
Institutionalization can be observed in Figure 5. It plots Party Institutionalization (y-axis) against 
the Polyarchy score (x-axis), V-Dem’s main electoral democracy index. As expected, there are both 
Autocracies and Democracies that score high in terms of Party Institutionalization. Interestingly, 
this is not the case at the opposite end of our index. While there are many authoritarian regimes 
with low levels of Party Institutionalization, the right-bottom corner of the graph is empty. Very 
democratic countries tend also to have very institutionalized parties.  
 
Figure 5. Party Institutionalization and Polyarchy 
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IV. Party Institutionalization in Selected Countries 
To provide additional illustrations of the V-Dem Party Institutionalization Index, we selected three 
sets of countries to explore in depth. These explorations aim at clarifying the potential – and the 
limits – of our index, relying on our common knowledge about a set of familiar cases. We start by 
analyzing levels of Party Institutionalization in two (contemporary) democracies: Brazil and the 
United States. We then change our focus to authoritarian regimes, and briefly analyze the scores 
of the Index for two authoritarian regimes: Bulgaria under Communism and Cuba since 1959. 
Finally, we take advantage of Basedau and Stroh’s (2008) index of Party Institutionalization for a 
set of African countries and compare the scores they produce to the scores in our index. 
Consequently, this section provides an overview of how the index performs in different contexts 
and how it compares to alternative measures of the same concept already available. 
Starting with the democratic regimes in Brazil and the United States (Figure 6), we are 
reminded that the countries experience major differences in the degree of their party 
institutionalization. While American parties are among the oldest in the world, scoring high in all 
the categories listed, Brazil is well-known for being a case of historically low-levels of Party 
Institutionalization (Mainwaring, 1999). These differences are captured very clearly in the index, 
with the United States consistently scoring much higher than Brazil on the Party 
Institutionalization Index. Additionally, the index captures other historical dynamics in the 
countries that are worth mentioning given their contribution to elucidating the power of our index.   
Starting with the United States, the data reveal a concave pattern. This should not come as 
a surprise to experts on American parties: the middle 1960s – the lowest point in the series – were 
times of ambiguous differentiation between Democrats and Republicans and lower levels of 
legislative cohesion – particularly as the contradictions between northern and southern democrats 
became more salient (Poole and Rosenthal, 2000). 
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Figure 6. Party Institutionalization in Brazil and the US 
 
 
Turning to Brazil, readers will notice that the index for Brazil reaches its highest levels 
under military dictatorship (1964-1985). Although this seems initially contradictory, it is important 
to recall that the Brazilian authoritarian regime was a kind of competitive authoritarianism avant-
la-lettre, where a stable two-party system was established. The two parties had national 
organizations with regional penetration, had public and distinct platforms, and the levels of 
legislative cohesion were relatively high (Kinzo, 1985, Hagopian, 2007). Brazilian parties during 
that period though, do score low on the linkages question, a characteristics of Brazilian parties that 
is consistent across most of the twentieth century (Mainwaring, 1999).  
If we move our analysis away from contemporary democracies and concentrate on 
authoritarian regimes, we again see how the V-Dem Party Institutionalization index captures the 
underlying dynamics of the countries we observe. We compare two communist regimes, Bulgaria 
(1945-1989) and Cuba (1959-) (Figure 7). While both regimes are marked by the prolonged reign 
of a single individual (Todor Zhivkov in Bulgaria, and Fidel Castro in Cuba), Cuba scores much 
lower than Bulgaria during the period. This difference reflects the conventional wisdom in 
comparisons between the Cuban regime and the countries in the Eastern bloc. Namely, that 
Communist parties played a much more important role in the latter. The end of communism and 
the dynamics following democratization in Bulgaria are also captured: levels of Party 
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Institutionalization decline after 1989 and the country struggles to re-institutionalization after 
transition. 
 
Figure 7. Party Institutionalization in Bulgaria and Cuba 
 
 
Finally, we take advantage of an existing index of party institutionalization to validate our 
new global index. Basedau and Stroh (2008) in their important contribution also provide the 
coding rules and scores for an index of party institutionalization measured for some African 
countries. Following their definitions, we compare the scores for the same 9 countries for which 
they build aggregate country-level indices of Party Institutionalization for the year of 2006.3 Figure 
8 uses a scatter-plot to show this comparison. On the x-axis we plot the values obtained in the V-
Dem Party Institutionalization Index, and on the y-axis we plot Basedau and Stroh’s scores. The 
figure shows their close similarity (r = 0.69). Although the rank-order of the countries differ slightly 
(Tanzania and Ghana have the highest values in Basedau and Stroh’s index, while in the V-Dem 
Index of Party Institutionalization they score only third and fourth; conversely, Botswana and 
Niger have the highest scores in our index and are placed third and fourth on theirs), the 
incorporation of V-Dem uncertainty estimates further demonstrates the similarities of the indices.  
 
																																								 																				
3 We rescaled Basedau and Stroh’s index from its original 0 to 8 scale to a 0 to 1 scale to facilitate the comparison. 
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Figure 8. Comparison with Basedau and Stroh (2008)4 
 
 
These comparisons provide additional information about the potential of the V-Dem Party 
Institutionalization Index. The comparison with Basedau and Stroh’s index also demonstrates how 
V-Dem can be helpful to scholars across the world: while most existing indices we use tend to 
cover only one or a few years, and only for a subset of countries, V-Dem provides reliable and 
valid scores for most countries in the world over a much longer period. 
 
V. Comparting the Party Institutionalization Index to 
Existing Indicators 
Finally, we investigate how the V-Dem Party Institutionalization Index compares to other 
measures that exist in the field. As we have discussed, operationalizing party and/or party system 
institutionalization has been an empirical challenge for comparative researchers. There are three 
common indicators that scholars have used: volatility, party age, and fragmentation. Measures of 
volatility typically rely on Pederson’s (1979) volatility measure and produce summary statistics 
																																								 																				
4 Countries included: Benin (BEN), Botswana (BWA), Burkina Faso (BFA), Ghana (GHA), Malawi (MWI), Mali 
(MLI), Niger (NER), Tanzania (TZA), Zambia (ZMB). 
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based on changes in parties’ vote or seat shares. (For critiques of this measure see Weghorst and 
Bernhard (2014) and Mainwaring et. al. (forthcoming).) Measures of party age report the average 
age of the largest parties in the system, while fragmentation is measured using the effective number 
of parties measure.  Table 1 describes each indicator. For comparison purposes we also include 
several other indicators:  
a) the Bartelsmann Transformation Index party system indicator, which is an expert 
coding of the extent to which there is a stable and socially rooted party system able to 
articulate and aggregate societal interests (www.bti-project.org). 
b) Each of the components of the Party Institutionalization Index: party branches, party 
organization, party linkages, party cohesion, and party platforms. 
c) The frequency of party switching, defined as the percentage (%) of the members of 
the national legislature changes or abandons their party in between elections (from V-
Dem).  
d) Extent to which national candidate selection is centralized within the parties (from V-
Dem) 
e) Party Strength. A measure devised by Bizzaro et. al. (2017) which measures the extent 
to which political parties within a polity are characterized by: (1) permanent national 
party organizations, (2) permanent local party branches, (3) centralized mechanisms of 
candidate selection, (4) legislative cohesion, (5) minimal party switching (where elected 
members of a party change their party affiliation in between elections), and (6) 
programmatic (rather than clientelistic) linkages to their social base. 
 
 
Table 1: Alternative Measures 
Indicator Description Source Coverage 
ENEP Effective number of electoral parties The Anocracies 
Dataset5 
1945-2012 
Age The average age of the two largest 
government parties and the largest 
opposition party 
World Bank/IADB6 1975-2015 
Volatility Electoral volatility between elections Mainwaring et. al. 
forthcoming 
1958-2015 
																																								 																				
5 https://sites.google.com/site/theanocracydataset/ 
6 https://publications.iadb.org/handle/11319/7408  
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BTI Party 
System 
The extent to which there is a stable and 
socially rooted party system able to 
articulate and aggregate societal interests 
Bertelsmann 
Transformation 
Index7 
2003-2016 
Branches Extent to which parties have permanent 
local party branches 
V-Dem 1900-2016 
Organization Extent to which political parties have 
permanent organizations 
V-Dem 1900-2016 
Links Nature of linkages between parties and 
their constituents 
V-Dem 1900-2016 
Cohesion Degree of legislative party cohesion V-Dem 1900-2016 
Platforms Extent to which parties have publicly 
available party platforms (manifestos) 
that are distinct from one another 
V-Dem 1900-2016 
Party 
Switching 
Frequency of party switching V-Dem 1900-2016 
Selection Extent to which candidate selection is 
centralized within the parties 
V-Dem 1900-2016 
Party Strength Extent to which political parties are 
unified, centralized, organizationally 
complex with mass constituencies  
Bizzaro et. al. 2017 1900-2016 
 
Figure 9 below displays the correlation coefficients between our Party Institutionalization index 
and these three common measures of institutionalization. Our party institutionalization measure 
performs as we would expect vis-à-vis these other indicators. Among the traditional indicators of 
institutionalization our indicator it is moderately and negatively correlated with electoral volatility, 
weakly and positively correlated with party age, and unrelated to party system fragmentation.8 The 
V-Dem Party Institutionalization Index is also correlated with BTI’s party system indicator at the 
.66 level. Turning to V-Dem indicators, not surprisingly the Index is strongly correlated with its 
constituent indicators, particularly branches, organizations, and platforms. It is also strongly 
correlated with Bizzaro et. al.’s Party Strength measure—not surprising given that Party Strength 
relies on several of the same indicators as our Index. In summary, the results of this correlation 
exercise is reassuring. Countries with more institutionalized parties in our index have lower 
																																								 																				
7 www.bti-project.org 
8 Fragmentation is weakly correlated with only party switching and electoral volatility. 
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electoral volatility, parties that are, on average, older, and were identified as institutionalized by 
alternative measures. The correlation, nevertheless, is far from perfect, suggesting that our Index 
captures some aspects of institutionalization that existing indicators do not.  
 
Figure 9: Correlation with Other Measures 
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Conclusion  
This article introduced the V-Dem Party Institutionalization Index, explained the theory that 
underlies the index construction, and test in multiple ways the validity and the reliability of the 
estimates. We follow McMann et al. (2016) in arguing that we should aim for indicators that meet 
the “good enough” threshold. We have tried to demonstrate that the Party Institutionalization 
Index we create is indeed good enough--that is, it is reliable, and valid. Moreover, we have tried to 
connect some of those indicators and the V-Dem Party Institutionalization Index in empirical and 
theoretically meaningful ways.  
We believe that it may now open a new set of possibilities for scholars researching about 
political parties. In other works, we have already started applying the variables in the V-Dem 
dataset regarding political parties to better understand many important outcomes. Bizzarro and his 
co-authors (2015), for example, found that countries with stronger parties tend to have consistently 
higher levels of economic growth, providing important contribution to the literature about the 
institutional determinants of political economy outcomes. Similarly, Bernhard and his co-authors 
(2015) used a previous version of this same index as a predictor of Democratic stability and found 
that stronger parties protect democracy: countries with more institutionalized parties have lower 
risk of experiencing democratic breakdown, even after controlling for many usual determinants of 
democratic stability – as GDP per capita. Scholars can now follow these steps and find innovative 
ways to bring parties to their analysis of political outcomes.  
Scholars may also advance our understanding of the determinants of variations in levels of 
party institutionalization, as well as variations in the individual questions about parties included in 
the dataset. We can now know more about the types of linkages parties predominantly establish 
with voters and understand where clientelistic and programmatic linkages tend to emerge. We can 
also expand our understanding of legislatures beyond the existing finds that have relied exclusively 
on roll call data. These and other contributions are now in the reach of scholars researching parties 
globally and this article is a first step in order to make these contributions advance. 
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Appendix 
Table A1. Other Party Variables 
Party ban (C) (v2psparban) 
Question: Are any parties banned? 
Clarification: This does not apply to parties that are barred from competing for failing to meet 
registration requirements or support thresholds. 
Responses: 
0: Yes. All parties except the state-sponsored party (and closely allied parties) are banned. 
1: Yes. Elections are non-partisan or there are no officially recognized parties. 
2: Yes. Many parties are banned. 
3: Yes. But only a few parties are banned. 
4: No. No parties are officially banned. 
Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model. 
Barriers to parties (C) (v2psbars) 
Question: How restrictive are the barriers to forming a party? 
Clarification: Barriers include legal requirements such as requirements for membership or 
financial deposits, as well as harassment. 
Responses: 
0: Parties are not allowed. 
1: It is impossible, or virtually impossible, for parties not affiliated with the government to form 
(legally). 
2: There are significant obstacles (e.g. party leaders face high levels of regular political 
harassment by authorities). 
3: There are modest barriers (e.g. party leaders face occasional political harassment by 
authorities). 
4: There are no substantial barriers. 
Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model. 
Opposition parties autonomy (C) (v2psoppaut) 
Question: Are opposition parties independent and autonomous of the ruling regime? 
Clarification: An opposition party is any party that is not part of the government, i.e., that has 
no control over the executive. 
Responses: 
0: Opposition parties are not allowed. 
1: There are no autonomous, independent opposition parties. Opposition parties are either 
selected or co-opted by the ruling regime. 
2: At least some opposition parties are autonomous and independent of the ruling regime. 
3: Most significant opposition parties are autonomous and independent of the ruling regime. 
4: All opposition parties are autonomous and independent of the ruling regime. 
Ordering: Answer only if previous question (v2psbars) is coded 1-4. 
Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model. 
Candidate selection—national/local (C) (v2pscnslnl) 
Question: How centralized is legislative candidate selection within the parties? 
Clarification: The power to select candidates for national legislative elections is often 
divided between local/municipal party actors, regional/state-level party organizations, 
and national party leaders. One level usually dominates the selection process, while 
sometimes candidate selection is the outcome of bargaining between the different 
levels of party organization. 
Responses: 
	 26	
0: National legislative candidates are selected exclusively by national party leaders. 
1: National legislative candidate selection is dominated by national party leaders but 
with some limited influence from local or state level organizations. 
2: National legislative candidates are chosen through bargaining across different 
levels of party organization. 
3: National legislative candidates are chosen by regional or state-level organizations, 
perhaps with some input from local party organizations or constituency groups. 
4: National legislative candidates are chosen by a small cadre of local or municipal 
level actors. 
5: National legislative candidates are chosen by constituency groups or direct 
primaries. 
Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model. 
Party switching (C) (v2psswitch) 
Question: Roughly what percentage (%) of the members of the national legislature changes or 
abandons their party in between elections? 
Clarification: Do not include official party splits (when one party divides into two or more 
parties) or dissolutions (when a party formally dissolves). 
Responses: Percent 
Scale: Interval 
Cross-coder aggregation: Bootstrapped. 
Party competition across regions (C) (v2pscomprg) 
Question: Which of the following best describes the nature of electoral support for major parties 
(those gaining over 10% of the vote)? 
Clarification: Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, i.e., no parties (not even pro-
government parties) were allowed. 
Responses: 
0: Most major parties are competitive in only one or two regions of the country, i.e., their support 
is heavily concentrated in a few areas. 
1: Most major parties are competitive in some regions of the country, but not in others. 
2: Most major parties are competitive in most regions of the country. 
Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model. 
Subnational party control (C) (v2pssunpar) 
Question: Does a single party control important policymaking bodies across subnational units 
(regional and local governments)? 
Clarification: Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, i.e., no parties (not even pro-
government parties) were allowed. 
Responses: 
0: In almost all subnational units (at least 90%), a single party controls all or virtually all 
policymaking bodies. 
1: In most subnational units (66%-90%), a single party controls all or virtually all policymaking 
bodies. 
2: In few subnational units (less than 66%), a single party controls all or virtually all policymaking 
bodies. 
Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model. 
 
 
 
 
